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The Dubious Extension of Punitive Damage Recovery
in Pennsylvania Products Liability Law

I.

INTRODUCTION

The award of punitive damages against a civil defendant has
long been a source of controversy as legal theorists and jurists continue to debate the propriety of assessing punitive damages in an
action intended to compensate victims of tortious conduct.1 While
the courts of those jurisdictions which permit punitive damages 2
generally agree that punitive damages are awarded to punish and
deter "outrageous" conduct,' the efficacy of punitive damages in
accomplishing their purpose in the products liability context is
highly questionable.
The case law relating to punitive damages has largely developed
in the context of an individual plaintiff pursuing an action against
an individual tortfeasor. The mechanical application of legal standards derived from these "one on one" actions to litigation against
1. See generally Nelson, Punishment for Profit: An Examination of the Punitive
Damage Award in Strict Liability, 18 FORUM 377 (1983); Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1257 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Owen, Punitive
Damages]; Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products,49 U. CH. L. Rev. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages]; Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation:Addressing the
Problems of Fairness,Efficiency and Control, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 37 (1983); Wheeler, The
ConstitutionalCase for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures,69 VA. L. Rev. 269 (1983).
2. Several states permit punitive damages only where statutory authorization specifically permits punitive damages. See USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 392 Mass. 392,
407, 467 N.E.2d 1271, 1284 (1984) ("We have consistently maintained that punitive damages
are not to be allowed in the absence of statutory authorization."); Barr v. Interbay Citizens
Bank of Tampa, 96 Wash. 2d 692, 699, 635 P.2d 441, 444 (1981) ("Since 1891, in an unbroken line of cases, it has been the law of this state that punitive damages are not allowed
unless expressly authorized by the legislature."); Killebrew v. Abbott Labs., 359 So. 2d 1275,
1278 (La. 1978) ("At the outset, we note that in Louisiana punitive damages are not allowable unless it be for some particular wrong for which a statute expressly authorizes the imposition of some such penalty.").
At least one state bans all punitive damages. See Miller v. Kingsley, 194 Neb. 123, 124,
230 N.W.2d 472, 474 (1975) ("It is a fundamental rule of law in this state that punitive,
vindictive, or exemplary damages are not allowed."). For a compilation of the status of the
recovery of punitive damages in products liability actions in the various states, see Myers &
Barrus, Punitive Damages in Products Laibility Cases: A Survey, 51 INS. COUNS. J. 212
(1984).
3. See generally Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 1265.
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manufacturers engaged in mass market commerce raises serious
questions of law and public policy. For example, manufacturers
will usually claim that they have committed only one act when
making a decision to market a product which may eventually prove
to contain a defect which results in injuries to several consumers.
Permitting each injured consumer to pursue a claim for punitive
damages against a manufacturer which has, realistically, engaged
in only a single act or a unified course of conduct arguably violates
precepts of fundamental fairness by exposing the manufacturer to
multiple punishment for a single deed. Furthermore, any award of
punitive damages, whether in a products case or the traditional
"one on one" tort action, arguably violates a basic tenet of the
American judicial system: that cases are to be decided by an impartial, dispassionate jury weighing the evidence." In order to entitle a plaintiff to punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove that
the defendant engaged in "outrageous" conduct; thus, the ill will
engendered in the jurors against the defendant may deny that
party both the right to have the litigation decided by a dispassionate jury, and to receive a judgment based solely on the evidence.
The public policy of punishing defendants in products or other
mass market situations conceivably may also result in wholly innocent parties bearing the brunt of the "punishment." Multiple large
scale punitive damage awards against a manufacturer may drive
manufacturers in tenuous financial straights into bankruptcy. Certainly, low-level employees and small stockholders of a corporation
who are far removed from the decision-making process share only
tangentially in the alleged culpability of the manufacturer/defendant. These individuals, however, may suffer a disproportionately
large share of the "punishment" through the loss of their jobs or
investments if the defendant is punished into insolvency.5
Large scale punitive damage awards, often in the millions, have
been rendered in various jurisdictions against manufacturers of automobiles,6 asbestos insulation,7 intra-uterine contraceptive de4. See Hoenig, Products Liability and Punitive Damages, 687 INs. L.J. 198 (1980).
5. The cumulative effect of multiple punitive damage awards has more than a merely
theoretical impact on the value of a stockholder's shares. A.H. Robins, Inc., assessed several
multi-million dollar punitive damage awards as a result of injuries arising out of the use of
the "Dalkon Shield" intra-uterine contraceptive device, reported a 99% decline in its net
income, from $0.61 to $0.01 per share, resulting in a substantial decline in the stock's market value. Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1984, at 4, col. 2.
6. Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App. 1982).
7. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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vices,8 clothing9 and numerous other products. In response to the
increasing number of such awards and the increasing size of punitive damage verdicts, a growing number of legal commentators and
jurists are calling for controls on punitive damages ranging from an
outright ban'0 on all punitive damages to ceilings on the amounts
which may be awarded." The American Bar Association has appointed a task force to study the propriety of awarding punitive
damages in products liability cases. 2
The growing controversy concerning punitive damages requires,
at the minimum, further study of the purposes and consequences
of punitive damages in general and their application to products
liability in particular. This comment will attempt to set forth the
current state of the law in Pennsylvania with respect to punitive
damages in products liability litigation and identify the problems
and criticisms of the application of punitive damages to product
liability litigation.' 3 Further, this comment will attempt to set
forth proposals to curb what is perceived to be a growing abuse of
the punitive damage remedy, while preserving the right to seek punitive damages in appropriate cases in order to foster the meritorious purposes of punitive damages.
II.

PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania has permitted punitive damages since at least
1791, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed a "large
8. Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
9. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
921 (1980).
10. An absolute bar to punitive damages is the approach currently employed in Nebraska. See supra note 2.
11. Connecticut limits punitive damages in products liability cases to an amount not
to exceed triple the compensatory damages. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp.
1984).
12. 70 A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 16.
13. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court currently has before it the appeal from the superior court in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp., Pa. Super. -,
469 A.2d 655 (1983),
appeal docketed (No. 33 W.D. 1983), the first reported Pennsylvania decision dealing with
the recovery of punitive damages in a products liability action. Only a reversal of the superior court's decision in its entirety would obviate, in Pennsylvania, the recent national trend
towards entitlement of a plaintiff to recover punitive damages in products liability actions.
As noted in Comment, The Imposition of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Actions in Pennsylvania,57 TEMp. L.Q. 203, 212 (1984), the appeal in Martin will place before
the supreme court the issues of determining the appropriate burden of proof in products
liability punitive damage actions, the appropriate definition of the proscribed conduct and
limitations, if any, on the monetary amount of a punitive damage award in products liability
actions.
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monetary" award against the defendant in a suit brought to enforce the plaintiff's right of access to an irrigation stream. 1 The
court affirmed the monetary award due to the defendant's "vexatiou[s] and highly improper conduct."' 5 In the years that followed,
Pennsylvania courts have employed varying terminology in
describing the type of conduct justifying the imposition of punitive
damages."6 The standards were eventually settled in Chambers v.
Montgomery, 17 in which the supreme court expressly adopted the
Restatement of Torts section 908 in holding that punitive damages
are "awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous
conduct."'" Outrageous conduct is conduct "done with a bad motive or with a reckless indifference to the interests of others.'"
Subsequent case law has described as evidencing a "bad motive" or
"reckless indifference" conduct which the factfinder determines to
be "malicious," "wanton," "willful," or "oppressive. ' '20
Regardless of the nomenclature the court chooses to employ in
describing the defendant's conduct, and consistent with Restatement of Torts section 500, Pennsylvania courts, and federal courts
applying Pennsylvania law, have held that an evaluation of the elements comprising "outrageous conduct" requires a determination
of the defendant's state of mind.2 ' The plaintiff must prove that
the defendant's actions resulted from a conscious decision to en14. Clyde v. Clyde, 1 Yeates 92 (Pa. 1791).
15. Id. at 93.
16. See Thompson v. Swank, 317 Pa. 158, 159, 176 A. 211, 211 (1934) (punitive damages are awarded for acts "committed willfully, maliciously, or so carelessly as to indicate
wanton disregard of the rights of the party injured."); Tyler v. Philadelphia Ritz-Carlton
Co., 75 Pa. Super. 353, 355 (1921) (punitive damages are appropriate where "the act be
wilfully and maliciously done, or in the absence of malice, it was committed under circumstances of oppression, outrage or recklessness").
17. 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963).
18. Id. at 344, 192 A.2d at 358.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., Pa. Super. -, 464 A.2d
1243, 1265 (1983); Smith v. Brown, 283 Pa. Super. 116, 120, 423 A.2d 743, 745 (1980).
21. See Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa.
1976). In Thomas the plaintiff was held to be not entitled to punitive damages since he
failed to demonstrate that the defendant possessed the "subjective kind of awareness that is
the distinguishing element of reckless conduct." Id. at 267.
The Restatement of Torts § 500 provides:
The actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or
having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize that the
actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other but
also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to him.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1976).
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gage in the conduct giving rise to the cause of action.2 2 Depending
upon the facts of the particular case, the defendant may be liable
for punitive damages even if subjectively unaware of the particular
hazard involved, if the factfinder determines that the hazard was
so obvious that the defendant may be charged with knowledge of
the hazard.23 Thus, constructive knowledge may expose a defendant to punitive damage liability.
There is conflicting authority as to whether the receipt of compensatory damages is a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages. In Hilbert v. Roth 4 the supreme court stated that "[t]he
right to punitive damages is a mere incident to a cause of action"
and that "[it is well recognized that no award for punitive damages may be made where actual damage has not been suffered. 2 5
The court in Hilbert affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, which sought punitive and compensatory damages against
one of two joint tortfeasors. The first defendant had fully satisfied
the judgment against the joint tortfeasors, and the second defendant moved for dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that
since the plaintiff no longer had a cause of action against the second defendant for compensatory damages, he was precluded from
seeking punitive damages.26
22. 414 F. Supp. at 267.
23. Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 574, 212 A.2d 440, 443 (1965).
The criteria for punitive damages as set forth in Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. 339,
192 A.2d 355 (1963), withstood a challenge that the standards were so vague as to not afford
adequate notice of the proscribed conduct, thereby violating constitutional due process. In
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), the court held that
reported case law had adequately defined "outrageous" conduct so as to provide defendants
with notice of conduct which may subject them to punitive damage liability and, further,
that the standards for punitive damages are no more vague than other court-defined standards, such as proximate cause or preponderance of the evidence. 548 F. Supp. at 377.
24. 395 Pa. 270, 149 A.2d 648 (1959).
25. Id. at 276, 149 A.2d at 652.
26. Id. at 277, 149 A.2d at 652.
The Hilbert court cited the Restatement of Torts § 908 comment c which provides, in
pertinent part:
Although as stated in comment e, the extent of the harm may be considered in determining [the amount of punitive damages], it is not essential to the recovery of punitive damages that the plaintiff should have suffered any harm, either pecuniary or
physical. Compensatory damages in a trifling amount and substantial punitive damages in the same verdict are not necessarily inconsistent. It is essential, however, that
facts be established which, apart from punitive damages, are sufficient to maintain a
cause of action.
Id.
The court went on to state that "it is well recognized that no award for punitive damages
may be made where actual damage has not been suffered." 395 Pa. at 377, 149 A.2d at 652.
This language has created confusion as to whether an award of actual damages is a prerequi-
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The Pennsylvania Superior Court, in Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, 27 relied upon Hilbert and dictum in Hughes v.
Babcock28 in holding that the amount of punitive damages must
"bear a reasonable relationship to the award of compensatory damages." '2 9 This would seem to indicate that an award of compensatory damages is a prerequisite to punitive damages; otherwise,
there could be no "reasonable relationship" by which to gauge the
punitive damages.3 0 The Delahanty court further declared that
"awards of punitive damages cannot be made where no actual
'31
damages have been suffered.
The opinion of the Delahanty court appears to be at odds with
site to recovery of punitive damages, notwithstanding comment c.
The quoted language in Hilbert led the court in Weider v. Hoffman, 238 F. Supp. 437
(M.D. Pa. 1965), to vacate a jury's award of punitive damages where the jury awarded no
actual damages. The Weider court held that "the award of actual damages, and not the
showing of actual damages, determines whether a verdict for punitive damages will stand."
Id. at 445 (citing Mitchell v. Randal, 228 Pa. 518, 137 A. 171 (1927)).
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., Pa.
Super. -,
464 A.2d 1243 (1983), relied on Weider in support of its statement that "awards
of punitive damages cannot be made where no actual damages have been suffered." 464 A.2d
at 1262. However, the same court, only a year earlier in Rhoads v. Heberling, 306 Pa. Super
35, 451 A.2d 1378 (1982), held that punitive damages may be assessed against a defendant
even though no compensatory damages were awarded. The Delahanty court noted that its
position was contrary to the court's holding in Rhoads. 464 A.2d at 1262.
The Rhoads court maintained that Hilbert had been misconstrued and that a plaintiff, in
order to recover punitive damages, need only maintain a cause of action against a defendant
and prevail on the issue of liability. 464 A.2d at 1283. In Rhoads, the defendant had fired a
rifle at a passing automobile. Two passengers were injured and received compensatory and
punitive damages. Two passengers were not injured, so they could not recover compensatory
damages, but were permitted to recover punitive damages since they prevailed on the issue
of liability. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 32-36.
The approach of the Rhoads court was adopted by the draftsmen of the Pennsylvania
Suggested Standard Jury Instructions (PA. SSJI). The suggested instruction does not require that the jury award compensatory damages in order to entitle the plaintiff to recover
compensatory damages. The draftsmen stated that since punitive damages do "not focus on
the harm caused to the plaintiff but rather on the conduct of the defendant," no requirement should be made that compensatory damages precede punitive damages. PA. SSJI (Civ.)
§ 14.02.
27. 464 A.2d 1243.
28. 349 Pa. 475, 37 A.2d 551 (1944).
29. 464 A.2d at 1265.
30. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Hughes, stated that "[a]lthough there is no
fixed rule governing the amount which should be awarded as exemplary damages, it must
not be disproportionate to the award of compensatory damages." 349 Pa. at 481, 374 A.2d at
554.
Some commentators believe that there should be no judicial formula for determining the
reasonableness of the relationship of the punitive damage award to the compensatory award.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13. See also infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
31. 464 A.2d at 1263.
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the opinion of the same court in Rhoads v. Heberling.3 2 Relying on
the Restatement of Torts, section 908 comment c, 33 the Rhoads
court stated that Hilbert merely required that the plaintiff establish facts giving rise to a cause of action against the defendant in
order to recover punitive damages.-4 According to the Rhoads
court, the plaintiff may receive punitive damages even if no compensatory damages are awarded. 5 The defendant's conduct in.
Rhoads was so egregious as to almost require punitive damageseven though no actual harm was suffered by-hence, no compensable damages were awardable to-two of the four plaintiffs. The defendant had fired several shots from a rifle into the car in which
the plaintiffs were traveling.3
As indicated in Delahanty and Hughes, the award of punitive
damages must be "reasonably related" to the award of compensatory damages. According to the supreme court in International
Electronics Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Products,37 the factfinder should
determine the amount of punitive damages "without yardstick,
subject to reduction by the court only if deemed excessive under
the circumstances of the particular case."3 Since the supreme
court has alternately spoken of punitive damages bearing a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages yet also allowing the
factfinder to assess punitive damages "without yardstick," there
appears to be no objective standard by which the reasonableness of
punitive damages may be gauged. The Delahanty court, in dictum,
stated that a fixed ratio between punitive damages and compensatory damages would "run counter to the object of punitive damages, which is to punish the defendant and set an example to deter
him and others from this type of conduct in the future."3 9 That
court approved punitive damages in a ratio of eleven to one to
compensatory damages, believing such a ratio to be "reasonably
related."' O
32. 306 Pa. Super. 35, 451 A.2d 1378 (1982).
33. The Restatement of Torts § 908 comment c provides, in parts pertinent to the
Rhoads court: "Although the extent of the harm may be considered in determining [the
amount of punitive damages] it is not essential to the recovery of punitive damages that the
plaintiff should have suffered any harm, either pecuniary or physical." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 908 comment c (1939).
34. 306 Pa. Super. at 44, 451 A.2d at 1383.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 46, 451 A.2d at 1379.
37. 370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 (1952).
38. Id. at 225, 88 A.2d at 46.
39. 464 A.2d at 1265.
40. Id. at 1266.
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Only in very limited circumstances does Pennsylvania case law
indicate that punitive damages are not recoverable. Since Pennsylvania apparently permits a liberal recovery of punitive damages,
courts applying Pennsylvania law have assumed there is no proscription against punitive damage recovery in products liability actions. As will be seen, the federal courts are primarily responsible
for the development of Pennsylvania's products liability/punitive
damages recovery.
III.

DEMANDS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY

ACTIONS BROUGHT UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW

The opinion of the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Martin v.
Johns-Manville Corp.' is the first reported Pennsylvania decision
in which an appellate court has held that a plaintiff may collect
punitive damages against a manufacturer in a products liability action. The fact that there are no earlier reported opinions of Pennsylvania state courts discussing a plaintiff's entitlement to punitive
damages in products liability is an indication of the relatively recent development of this particular mode of relief in the Commonwealth. While there is thus an obvious paucity of state court authority as to whether a demand for punitive damages is cognizable
in a products liability action, the question has been addressed in
federal courts applying Pennsylvania law.
The seminal case applying Pennsylvania law to an action in
which a plaintiff sought punitive damages against a mass-market
manufacturer is the opinion of the Third Circuit in Hoffman v.
Sterling Drug, Inc."2 The Hoffman court reversed that portion of
the trial court's decision which denied the plaintiff a requested
jury instruction on punitive damages.'" The plaintiff was blinded
as a result of an accumulation of chloroquine, the active ingredient
in Aralen, a dermatitis medication, manufactured by Sterling and
prescribed by the plaintiff's physician."" The plaintiff claimed that
the dangers of chloroquine retinopathy were known to Sterling and
that Sterling provided inadequate warnings of Aralen's possible
complications.' Sterling relied primarily on warning cards which
were to be distributed by Sterling's sales representatives." The ap41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

469 A.2d 655. See supra note 13.
485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973).
Id. at 145.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 146. Evidence indicated that Sterling's sales representatives routinely gave
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peals court held that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence
that Sterling knowingly undertook inadequate measures47 to inform
the medical community of the dangers of chloroquine.
Relying upon the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Chambers v. Montgomery,4 8 the Hoffman court held that Sterling's
measures to warn of chloroquine's dangers may have constituted
"reckless disregard of the public's health [and should] also have
been submitted to the jury" for consideration of possible punitive
damages.4 The Hoffman court did not, however, comment on the
absence of prior state authority regarding punitive damages in
products liability. The court merely relied upon Chambers and
other early Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions which set forth
the criteria upon which punitive damages will be permitted, and
did not discuss any public policy ramifications of permitting this
type of recovery in products liability. Such considerations were
50
noted, however, in Thomas v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc.,
a subsequent case, where the court observed that applying the
standards of Chambers v. Montgomery to products liability actions
"raises a unique set of problems not before encountered with regard to punitive damages."'" The court did not elaborate on the
"unique" problems of applying punitive damages to products liability since the court felt that Hoffman foreclosed any consideration of the threshold question of whether punitive damage claims
were cognizable in Pennsylvania products liability actions.52
physicians drug warning cards and promotional brochures only if the representatives were
aware that the physician prescribed the particular drug. Often, physicians did not meet with
the sales representatives and not all of those who did would accept the cards or brochures.
It was not until six years after the date of the plaintiff's first treatment with Aralen that
Sterling included a warning as to Aralen's potential relationship to retinal damage in the
drug's descriptive information published in the Physician's Desk Reference, commonly acknowledged as the primary reference source for drug information. Id.
47. Id. at 147.
48. 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963).
49. 485 F.2d at 147.
50. 414 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
51. Id. at 264.
52. Id. at 264 n.13. In reaching the conclusion that punitive damages may be recovered
in a products liability case, the court stated:
Although the specific question appears not to have been raised or ruled upon directly
by the Pennsylvania courts or any court interpreting Pennsylvania law, we take it as
established, by virtue of the court's tacit approval of the punitive damage claims on
appeal in Hoffman, 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973), that there is no per se preclusion
against awarding punitive damages, where, as here, strict liability under § 402A of the
Restatement of Torts (Second) was introduced as plaintiff's theory of liability. This
court knows of no sound reason why the conclusion should be otherwise.
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The Thomas court's consideration of the plaintiff's punitive
damage claim, based on the "[Hoffman] court's tacit approval of
the punitive damage claim," 3 was made less difficult by the defendant's failure to argue that punitive damages may not, as a matter
of law, be awarded in products liability actions. 4 The Thomas
court, however, denied the claim that the plaintiff was entitled to
punitive damages since the court found that the plaintiff had
failed to prove that the manufacturer was aware of the particular
risk involved. While the plaintiff did prove that the dangers of
electrical shock in the use of the defendant's surgical viewing device was foreseeable, the plaintiff was held to have to prove that
the defendant "fully realized" the extent of the risk in order to
classify disregard of that risk as "recklessness.""6
In a similar manner, the court in Olsen v. United States5 7 denied the plaintiff's request for a jury instruction on the issue of
punitive damages due to the plaintiff's failure to produce sufficient
evidence warranting such an instruction.58 Citing Chambers v.
Montgomery, the court held that the "defendant's mere failure to
conduct a particular test in addition to or instead of those tests
admittedly conducted could not, without more, rise to the level of
'outrageous' conduct.' 59 Permitting the jury to consider punitive
damages where the plaintiff proved, at most, only mere negligence
"would be to allow a verdict to be based upon mere speculation,
prejudice, or innuendo." 60
Judge Bechtle, who presided in Olsen v. United States, again
53.

414 F. Supp. at 264 n.13.

54.

Id.

55. Id. at 267.
56. Id. In requiring more than a mere forseeability of the hazard, the court stated,
"But the fact that the danger should have been foreseen does not mean, contrary to plaintiff's assertion, that the risk was fully realized, or at least, realized to the extent necessary to
show that degree of knowledge which when consciously disregarded deserves the opprobation of recklessness." Id..
But see Smith v. Brown, 283 Pa. Super. 116, 423 A.2d 743 (1980):
"reckless indifference to the interests of others", or as it is sometimes referred to,
"wanton misconduct", means that "the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must
be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow".
Id. at 120, 423 A.2d at 745 (citing Evans v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 418 Pa. 567, 574, 212
A.2d 440, 443 (1965)).
57. 521 F. Supp. 59 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
58, Id. at 70.
59. Id.

60. Id.
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dealt with a claim for punitive damages against a manufacturer in
Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd."1 Carey Canadian Mines is
distinguishable from the prior punitive damages/products liability
actions applying Pennsylvania law, since it involved multiple
plaintiffs in a suit against multiple defendants. The defendants
were manufacturers of asbestos insulation and the plaintiffs were
former employees of the defendants.6 2 The plaintiffs initially had
to overcome the statutory bar to suit by an employee against an
employer for work-related injury found in the Pennsylvania Workman's Compensation Act 3 and the Pennsylvania Occupational
Disease Act. 4 The court held that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to raise a question for the jury as to whether the
employer/defendants "deliberately intended" to injure the plaintiffs by ignoring medical evidence of the dangers of prolonged exposure to asbestos.6 5 Neither the Workman's Compensation Act
nor the Occupational Disease Act bars an employee from pursuing
a recovery against the employer if the action is based on the employer's alleged intentional torts against the employee. 6 The same
evidence upon which the jury in Carey Canadian Mines was permitted to rely to find that the employer/defendant engaged in an
intentional tort against the former employees/plaintiffs may also
be found to exhibit the defendant's "reckless indifference to the
rights of plaintiffs," thereby constituting "outrageous" conduct on
which an award for punitive damages may be based. 7
The distinguishing feature in Carey CanadianMines, and a feature which is present in numerous punitive damage/products liability actions in other jurisdictions, is that multiple plaintiffs recovered punitive damages as a result of an isolated or single course
of conduct of the defendant."6 While the court apparently agreed
61. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
62. Id. at 365.
63. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 § 481 (Purdon 1984).
64. Id. § 1403.
65. 548 F. Supp. at 380. Defendant Philip Carey Mfg. Inc. had hired a physician to
study the effects of prolonged exposure to asbestos. The physician recommended that the
employees be warned that they were at risk due to their exposure to asbestos, that protective devices such as respirators be issued to employees and that the employees be placed on
a program of medical surveillance. The physician's employment was terminated following
the submission of the report and the employees were not advised of the recommendations.
Id. at 379-80.
66. Id. at 378.
67. Id. at 381.
68. For example, A. H. Robins Co., manufacturer of the Dalkon Shield intra-uterine
contraceptive device, has been involved in over 11,000 cases in various jurisdictions alleging

692
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with the principles of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section
908, comment e, which calls for the court to consider the punitive
damage awards assessed against the defendant in prior actions, the
court refused to allow defense counsel to argue to the jury that the
jury should consider that it had earlier punished the defendant
when it considered the punitive damage claims of prior plaintiffs6 9
The court felt that such an argument was not necessary since the
jury would clearly be cognizant of punitive damage assessments it
made to prior plaintiffs in the same proceeding.7 0 Although the
court was not called upon to address the issue, Carey Canadian
Mines raises the specter of possible double jeopardy against the
manufacturer of a mass-marketed product; 71 the defendant is, in
effect, being punished repeatedly for the same act.
In Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.72 an issue beyond that of
possible double jeopardy was raised. In a suit based upon an asbestos-related illness in which the plaintiff sought compensatory and
punitive damages, the court rejected the defendant's argument
that punitive damages should be barred in products liability ac73
tions since the deterrence effect is lacking in products liability.
The defendant maintained that manufacturers are deterred from
marketing known defective goods by their interest in maintaining
their good reputations in the marketplace; since market factors deter the sale of defective goods, punitive damages, so the argument
goes, are unnecessary. 74 The court, however, held that the availainjuries incurred in the use of the Dalkon Shield. Approximately 2.2 million Dalkon Shields
had been sold prior to their removal from the market in 1974. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1984 at 3,

col. 2.
69. 548 F. Supp. at 391.
70. Id.
71. A constitutionally based double jeopardy defense to multiple punitive damage
claims is unavailable to a products liability defendant since double jeopardy is available as a
defense in criminal matters only. See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 240 (1961). See
also Jordan v. Gore, 288 Pa. Super. 86, 431 A.2d 300 (1981).
Some commentators, however, believe that "considerations of fundamental, ordinary fairness" require limitations on punitive damages where a single design defect may result in
potential injury to many plaintiffs. See Tozer, Punitive Damages and Products Liability, 39
INS. COUNS. J. 300, 301 (1972). Most courts reject the "fundamental fairness" argument, stating that sufficient procedural safeguards are available to protect a defendant facing multiple
punitive damage claims (for example, bifurcation of the liability and damages portions of
the trial or instructions to the jury that they may consider prior punitive damage claims
against the defendant). See, e.g., Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 215-16 (Colo.
1984).
72. 469 A.2d 655 (1983).
73. Id. at 662.
74. Id. The rationale that the possibility of multiple compensatory damages accomplishes the objectives of punitive damages, thus vitiating the need for punitive damages in
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bility of punitive damages is an effective and necessary deterrent
since the availability of punitive damages may increase the volume
of litigation against a manufacturer. 5 The availability of punitive
damages, the court reasoned, may encourage a plaintiff to pursue a
lawsuit where the compensatory damages would be minimal, with
the manufacturer's desire to reduce its exposure to litigation providing the necessary deterrent.7 6 The Martin court concluded that
the deterrent of punitive damages was essential in products liability, adding that this was so even if occasionally resulting in the
bankruptcy of the defendant."

III. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
RESULTING FROM THE ALLOWANCE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
There is a growing fear, even among proponents of the recovery
of punitive damages in products liability, that this mode of recovery is currently being abused and is the subject of too little research and analysis as to its public policy ramifications.78 Professor
David G. Owen, for example, author of an influential article in the
Michigan Law Review, 79 and frequently cited as a leading scholar
advocating the assessment of punitive damages in products liability litigations, appears to have become somewhat reserved in his
advocacy of punitive damages, not because of a conceptual flaw in
the underlying merits of such recoveries, but because of increasing
abuse of, and too liberal an allowance of, punitive damages.8 0 This
products liability, was adopted by the court in Jackson v. Johns-Manville Corp., 727 F.2d

506, 525 (5th Cir. 1984).
75. 469 A.2d at 663.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 665. The "bankruptcy" of the defendant may be of a dubious nature, such as
where a viable enterprise seeks the protection of the bankruptcy system to protect its assets

from anticipated litigation; such was the apparent strategy of the Johns-Manville Corporation, which filed for bankruptcy protection despite a net worth of $1.1 billion and combined
short and long term debt of approximately $600 million. See Comment, In re JohnsManville Corp.: The Delicate Balance of FairnessBetween Bankruptcy and Products Liability Law, 3 J.L. & CoM. 365 (1983).
78. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1. See also

Palmer v. A. H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187, 228 (Colo. 1984) (Rovira, J., dissenting) ("The
problems which arise from the application of punitive damages in strict liability cases are
substantial and require the benefit of extensive research into the economic and social implications of such a decision.").
79.
80.

Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 1.
See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1, where Profes-

sor Owen concludes, "Yet the experience of the past several years has raised questions
whether the punitive damages doctrine is being abused in products cases, whether some
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abuse, evident in the increasing number of multi-million dollar
verdicts, has sparked a reappraisal of the purposes of punitive
damages and calls for restrictions on their use in products liability.
As noted earlier, the standards for the application of punitive
damages in Pennsylvania were enunciated in Chambers v. Montgomery8 ' and have been applied in products liability cases. Chambers, and the case law upon which the Chambers court relied, involved claims for punitive damages, which, even by the then
contemporary standards, involved relatively small amounts of
money. 2 By modern standards the involved sums would be considered trifling.
A.

Empassioned Jurors

Chambers, which involved a simple assault-a "one on one"
tort-and small sums of money, has been mechanically applied to
cases of mass-market products liability involving millions of dollars
of requested recovery. When the vague, subjective standards of
Chambers are coupled with the general societal prejudice and suspicions against "Big Business,"83 the potential exists that awards
of punitive damages may be assessed more on the basis of an attorney's ability to enflame the jury, rather than on a reasoned analysis
of the degree of the defendant's culpability.84 Theoretically, in order to safeguard against an enflamed jury delivering a "run away
verdict," Pennsylvania courts will consider punitive damage
that
awards "to be excessive when they are so large as to indicate
85
the factfinder was influenced by passion or prejudice.

It is an accepted tenet of American jurisprudence that juries
manufacturers are being punished who should not be, and whether penalties, though appropriately assessed, are sometimes unfairly large." Id. at 59.
81. 411 Pa. 339, 192 A.2d 355 (1963). See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
82. The plaintiff in Chambers was awarded $4000 compensatory and $2500 punitive
damages. The punitive damages portion of the judgment was set aside by the supreme court
since the evidence indicated that the plaintiff's injury resulted from "an unfortunate freak"
accident rather than "outrageous" conduct. 411 Pa. at 344, 192 A.2d at 358.
83. Professor Owen takes the somewhat dubious view that juror preconceptions adverse to business defendants are not necessarily undesirable since businesses have greater
access to crucial evidence and are better able to absorb the consequences of a wrongly decided verdict. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 11-12.
84. The often highly scientific evidence in a products case has raised questions as to
the ability of jurors to properly evaluate complex evidence, thus calling into question the
role of the jury in assessing punitive damages in products liability cases. See Seltzer, Punitive Damages in Mass Tort Litigation, supra note 1, at 49-50.
85. Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., __ Pa. Super. -, 464 A.2d 1243,
1265 (1983).
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should render verdicts based upon their review of the evidence,
free of emotion or passion. Punitive damages, however, require the
jury to find that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous." S6 Ideally, the juror would be capable of separating emotional feelings of
outrage from the legal standards of outrage, but the practical ability of a juror to do so is, at best, speculative. While this problem is
obviously present in any case involving punitive damages, it is particularly so in cases brought in products liability since in the majority of cases the defendant would be a "faceless" corporate entity. The outrage felt by the jury vitiates dispassionate reason.
Punitive damage recovery presents the paradox of requiring a
juror to become outraged by the defendant's conduct, yet, at the
same time, requiring that verdicts influenced by "passion or
prejudice" be set aside. By what standard may the appropriateness
of punitive damage verdicts be weighed? The accepted standard
requires outrage, yet decries passion. This obvious paradox is a
major source of criticism of punitive damages in general and their
recovery in products liability in particular. 7
B. Incompatibility with Strict Liability
Criticism of punitive damages in products liability actions centers not only on the paradox of an award predicated on, or at least,
easily subject to, passion in a supposedly dispassionate legal system, but on. a perceived inherent conflict of punitive damages and
strict liability.88 Since strict liability, the principle vehicle for recovery in actions resulting from injuries from the use of products,
looks only to the alleged defectiveness of the product,"9 whereas
punitive damages requires review of the culpability of the defendant, some commentators believe that the allowance of punitive
damages is inherently anomalous in a products liability context.9"
The majority view, however, is that there is no inconsistency or
incompatability since strict liability, while establishing the defendant's liability, does not "delimit the remedies that might be ap86. Chambers v. Montgomery, 411 Pa. at 344, 192 A.2d at 358.
87. See Nelson, supra note 1; Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra
note 1; Hoenig, supra note 4.
88. See Nelson, supra note 1; Comment, Punitive Damages in Strict Products Liability Litigation, 23 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 333 (1981).
89. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 95-100 (W. Keeton 5th ed.

1984).
90. Nelson, supra note 1; Tozer, supra note 71. See also Butcher v. Robertshaw Controls Co., 550 F. Supp. 692 (D. Md. 1981) (strict liability is incompatible with punitive
damages).
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propriate if a plaintiff's accident is attributable to some aggravated
fault of the manufacturer."9' 1 The superior court in Martin v.
Johns-Manville Corp.92 also believed that punitive damages and
products liability were not conceptually inconsistent because, although strict liability does not require consideration of a defendant's fault, it does not necessarily preclude it. 3 Still, strict liability substantially eases the plaintiff's burden in establishing the
liability of the defendant; thus, a jury receptive to a finding of the
defendant's liability may become irrationally sympathetic to arguments that the liability of the defendant is aggravated and appropriate for punitive damages.
C.

Lack of a Deterrent Effect

Another criticism of punitive damages is that, in a mass-market
context, they cannot effectively deter the marketing of defective
products; the vague and subjective standards of punitive damages
may not convince a manufacturer, when assessed such an award,
that it engaged in improper conduct. Manufacturers presumably
will defend vigorously an allegation that they marketed a defective
product. The isolated instance of a jury finding, by a mere preponderance of the evidence, that the product was defective and its sale
constituted "reckless" conduct will not necessarily lead to alterations in the product, especially if the cost of alterations greatly exceeds the potential liability.9 '
In Pennsylvania, shifting the burden of paying punitive damages
from the tortfeasor to an insurance carrier by means of a liability
5
insurance policy has been held to be violative of public policy.
Since a manufacturer cannot, therefore, recoup its punitive damage losses via insurance, the argument that punitive damages will
have a deterrent effect would appear to have greater credence in
91. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 1269.
92. 469 A.2d 655 (1983).
93. The Martin court cited Maxey v. Freightliner Corp., 450 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Tex.
1978), aff'd, 623 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1980), in which the court stated that punitive damages
and strict liability are conceptually different; strict liability is a basis for recovery and punitive damages are a basis for deterrence. Since they are independent concepts, their differences in purpose are irrelevant. 469 A.2d at 662 n.11.
94. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 387; Wheeler, supra note 1, at 308-09. See also Hoenig, supra note 4, at 204-05. Since punitive damages may not deter a defendant, they have
been described as mere "windfalls" to plaintiffs. Id.
95. See also Reimer v. DeLisio, 501 Pa. 662, 666, 462 A.2d 1308, 1310 (1983) (Larsen,
J., dissenting); Esmond v. Liscio, 209 Pa. Super. 100, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
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Pennsylvania."' If the manufacturer markets a necessary or highly
desirable product and is on a sound financial footing, however,
nothing prevents that manufacturer from passing on its punitive
damage costs to consumers, at a rate the market will bear, as it
presumably does its other liability expenses.9 7 Only if the punitive
damages threaten the continued existence of the manufacturer
would the deterrent effect of such damages be felt. Many jurisdictions, however, will not permit punitive damages to reach such a
level that the existence of the manufacturer is threatened; 8 the
deterrent value of punitive damages is thus doubtful.
The superior court in Martin v. Johns-Manville Corp.99 cited
with approval language in In re Northern District of California
Dalkon Shield I.U.D. Products Liability Litigation"0 that the intention of punitive damages is "to sting, not kill, a defendant." 10 1
Yet, the superior court went on to state that even the resultant
bankruptcy of the defendant should not militate against punitive
damages. 0 2 The superior court, therefore, will seek to achieve the
perceived deterrent effect of punitive damages even if the existence
of the defendant as an ongoing business entity is thereby terminated. The termination of a manufacturer's existence would, obviously, be an ultimate deterrent of questionable wisdom; however,
the paradoxical reality must be acknowledged that any punishment less drastic will enable the defendant to pass along the costs
of punitive damages to consumers.
96. The Martin court, in dictum, stated that even if punitive damage insurance coverage was available in Pennsylvania, punitive damages would still have a deterrent effect. The
court stated that the potentially high cost of such coverage, based upon a policyholder's loss
experience, would have the desired deterrent effect. 469 A.2d at 663-64.
97. See Hoenig, supra note 4, at 204.
98. To avoid bankrupting a defendant, the court in In re Northern District of California "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Litigation, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), discussing
the possible effects of the multiplicity of lawsuits filed in California against A. H. Robins
stated that "[e]ach plaintiff may then receive a punitive damage award with the result that
the cumulative awards financially destroy the defendant. The purpose of punitive damages
is to sting, not kill, the defendant. Punitive damages should not be permitted to bankrupt a
defendant." Id. at 899.
99. 469 A.2d 655 (1983).
100. 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
101. Id.
102. In rejecting the defendant's contention that punitive damages in products liability should not be permitted where multiple claims may drive a defendant into insolvency,
the Martin court declared: "But if the defendant's conduct was so reckless, and injured so
many people that the effect of the damages awarded against it is bankruptcy, we are hardpressed to understand why that defendant should not be required to live with the consequences of its actions." 469 A.2d at 665.
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Impeding the Investigation of Products Liability Claims

The subjective awareness of the hazard by the defendant is frequently proven by the placement into evidence of internal memoranda discussing the hazard.10 3 Conscientious manufacturers seeking to fully explore any possible defect or risk involved in use of
their product, as noted by Professor Owen,10 4 would encourage
critical comment of their product. With the increasing size of punitive damage verdicts, a manufacturer, in order to avoid supplying
the ammunition at its own execution, may purge its files of critical
memoranda once the product has been placed on the market. Less
scrupulous manufacturers may even forego complete research.10 5
The resultant difficulty of proof faced by the plaintiff would work
counter to the objectives to be achieved by the expanded application of punitive damages in products liability.
E. Double Jeopardy
A further criticism of punitive damages in products liability litigation is that frequent punitive damage awards against a manufacturer may be considered to be tantamount to subjecting the defendant to double jeopardy. The court in Neal v. Carey Canadian
Mines, Ltd.106 permitted multiple punitive damage recoveries
against the defendants for essentially a single tort-the decision to
withhold from asbestos workers information concerning the deleterious effects of prolonged exposure to asbestos.10 7 The court apparently relied on the premise that, rather that having committed one
tort, the defendants had committed several individual tortious acts
regarding the individual plaintiffs.10 8
Courts have never accepted a constitutional defense to repeated
0 9
punitive damage awards based on a double jeopardy argument;"
however, the basic fairness of subjecting a defendant to multiple
claims based upon an isolated act or course of conduct has been
called into question." 0 The district court in In re Northern Dis103.

See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 16-20.

104. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Id. at 366.
Id. at 391.
See generally Wheeler, supra note 1. See also supra text accompanying notes 68-

71.
110. See Tozer, supra note 71. See also Comment, Punitive Damages in Mass-Marketed Products Litigation, 14 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 405 (1981).
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trict of California Dalkon Shield L U.D. Products Liability Litigation stated that "[clommon sense dictates that a defendant should
not be subjected to multiple civil punishment for a single act or
unified course of conduct which causes injury to multiple plaintiffs."' The court believed that the defendant in a civil action
should be protected against multiple punitive damage awards in
order to extend to the defendant the "'fundamental fairness'
which lies at the heart of constitutional due process.""' 2 The court
in Carey CanadianMines, however, did not address the concept of
"fundamental fairness," since the characterization of each plaintiff's injury as acts "separate and distinct with respect to each individual plaintiff"" 3 precluded a necessity to consider whether the
defendants were subjected to "multiple civil punishment for a single act or unified course of conduct.""' 4
F.

Unintended Adverse Impact on Innocent Parties

If Pennsylvania courts accept the rationale of the court in Martin v. Johns-Manville, Pennsylvania will permit the imposition of
punitive damages even if they will result in the bankruptcy of the
defendant;" 5 therefore, some consideration should be given to
those who may be "punished" as a result of the defendant's
bankruptcy.
Martin cites several decisions of various jurisdictions in which it
had been held that punitive damages should be assessed against
the defendant, although the defendant's bankruptcy will foreclose
recovery by subsequent plaintiffs identically injured.1 6 The Martin court described as "unfortunate" the denial of recovery to late
arriving plaintiffs where the defendants' assets have been depleted
due to satisfaction of prior punitive damage awards."' The court
was concerned with preventing the defendant from realizing a
"windfall" through the denial of punitive damage claims where the
111. 526 F. Supp. at 900.
112. Id. at 899.
113. 548 F. Supp. at 378.
114. The court in Dalkon Shield IUD Products, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
considered the marketing of a mass-marketed product to be a single act, contrary to the
opinion of the court in Carey Canadian Mines. In order not to violate "fundamental fairness" by repeatedly punishing a defendant for committing a single act, the court in Dalkon
Shield IUD Products certified all Dalkon Shield users seeking punitive damages as a class.
526 F. Supp. at 900.
115. See supra text accompanying note 102.
116. 469 A.2d at 665.
117. Id. at 666.
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defendant's conduct resulted in numerous injuries.118 It is submitted, however, that effective controls on punitive damages, and not
necessarily their complete abolition, may work to prevent injured
parties being denied recovery due to exhaustion of the defendant's
assets via prior payments of punitive damage verdicts.
The Martin court also rejected the contention that numerous
punitive damage judgments result in undeserved injury to innocent
shareholders through the depreciation of the value of the defendant's stock.""i The court did not believe that shareholders, who
elect the board of directors, the individuals ultimately responsible
for the operation of the corporation, should be considered "innocent" where the corporation engaged in tortious conduct. 2 The
difficulty with the court's position is that, typically, a large corporation has many thousands of shareholders who have, realistically,
no participation in the day-to-day operation of the corporation.
While the shareholders elect the board of directors, small shareholders generally leave the selection of the board of directors to
owners of large blocks of stock; the relationship of the small shareholder to the conduct of the corporation is thus too tangential to
justify their "punishment." That such punishment may occur is
patent: the effect of punitive damages on a corporation's earning

record directly affects the small shareholders-typically those least
capable of absorbing punishment and least deserving of
12
punishment. 1
The interests of employees who do not share in the decisionmaking process of the corporation and who face loss of their employment if the corporation is punished into bankruptcy also deserve attention in a court's review of a punitive damage award. As
noted by Professor Owen, "concepts of moral responsibility, punishment, and deterrence can mean vastly different things when
judging the 'conduct' of an institution rather than a human being. ' ' 1 2 While the punishment may be levied against the corporate
entity, the consequences of that punishment may be suffered primarily by individuals who hold no individual moral responsibility
118. Id. The Martin court believed that permitting an imminent bankruptcy to foreclose the assessment of punitive damages would "reward" manufacturers who injured large
numbers of consumers.
119. Id. at 664-65.
120. Id. The approach of the Martin court is supported by certain commentators who
take the questionable, if not unrealistic, view that investors knowingly assume the risk of
liability for a corporation's tortious acts. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 13, at 209.
121. See, e.g., supra note 5.
122. See Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 16.
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for the tortious conduct. The approach taken by courts awarding
punitive damages in products liability claims may thus potentially
throw much of the burden of punishment on individuals no one
intended to punish.
Any reallocation of resources will have a ripple effect on third
parties not directly involved in the reallocation process. Likewise,
any party deprived of financial resources can raise some argument
of unfairness in the deprivation process. The large number of third
parties affected in products claims, the many doubts about fairness
in the awarding of punitive damages in products liability claims, as
well as the unintended consequences of these claims justify a fundamental reappraisal of the purposes of punitive damages in the
products liability context and a reform of the processes by which
punitive damages may be recovered.
IV.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ASSESSMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY

A.

Limited Ban on Punitive Damages

The change in the current method of assessment of punitive
damages which would be the most simple to administer and effective in result would be to simply bar all judicial consideration of
any punitive damage claim. As was observed earlier,1 23 courts in
the State of Nebraska will not entertain punitive damage claims.
The Nebraska ban extends to all civil cases, so was not meant to
specifically address the problems of punitive damages in products
24
liability.
An outright ban on all punitive damages may be overly Draconian. 12 5 Still, Pennsylvania courts could bar punitive damages in
the products liability context consistently with the limited application of punitive damages in other fields of law presently in effect in
Pennsylvania. For example, Pennsylvania currently prohibits the
recovery of punitive damages in wrongful death actions.1 2 1 In Har123. See supra note 2.
124. Id.
125. Yet, commentators citing a perceived lack of deterrent effect, as well as a windfall
to plaintiffs and increased costs to consumers and other criticisms of punitive damages, have
called for the abolition of punitive damages in all civil cases. See Carsey, The Case Against
Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative Outline, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Tozer,
supra note 71; Comment, Mass Liability and Punitive Damage Overkill, 30 HASTINGS L.J.
1797 (1979).
126. The Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act is codified at 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
8301 (Purdon 1983).
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vey v. Hassinger,2 7 the superior court, relying upon the early case
of Pennsylvania Railroad v. Henderson,2 ' held that punitive damages are not recoverable in wrongful death actions."' Harvey is
consistent with the prevailing majority rule in the United States in
the handling of wrongful death.130 California, for example, denies
punitive damages in wrongful death actions for policy reasons
which could easily be applied to products liability, i.e., in order to
avoid the danger of "excessiveness where concrete wrongdoing is
31
absent.'
Accepting for the sake of argument that punitive damages in
products liability is necessary to, and effective in, the deterrence of
harmful conduct by a corporation, the denial of punitive damages
in products liability would reflect a choice of policy closely analogous to the United States Supreme Court's rationale in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Foust.13 In Foust, the
Court refused to impose punitive damages on a labor union as requested by a union member who sought damages against the union
for allegedly inadequate representation of that member's grievance
against his employer. 1 33 Justice Marshall, writing for the Court declared that "[s]uch awards could deplete union treasuries, thereby,
impairing the effectiveness of unions as collective bargaining
agents. Inflicting this risk on employees, whose welfare depends
upon the strength of their unions, is simply too great a price for
34
whatever deterrent effect punitive damages may have.""1
Clearly, the question of inflicting monetary sanctions against a
labor union raises policy considerations easily distinguishable from
sanctions imposed against a corporate mass-marketer."15 The common thread, however, in the rationale of Foust and the position
taken by proponents of a ban on punitive damages in products liability is the concern that punitive damages harm innocent parties
127. 315 Pa. Super. 97, 461 A.2d 814 (1983).
128. 51 Pa. 315 (1865).
129. 315 Pa. Super. at 100, 461 A.2d at 815. Punitive damages are, however, permissible in actions brought under Pennsylvania's Survival Act, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8302
(Purdon 1983).
130. See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980) (punitive damages
are not recoverable under California wrongful death statute).
131. Id. at 1319.
132. 442 U.S. 42 (1978).
133. Id. at 43-44.
134. Id. at 50-51.
135. The Court was concerned about the possibility of crippling the union financially,
thus preventing it from adequately representing its members; thereby defeating the policy
of equality of bargaining power implicit in national labor legislation. Id.
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such as employees and stockholders.
B.

Modification of the Description of the Prohibited Conduct
and a Heightened Burden of Proof

As noted earlier, the description of the type of conduct which
may give rise to punitive damages was established in tort actions
involving small sums of money.1 36 The standard set forth in these
early cases must be revised in order to keep pace with the increasing complexity of products cases, as well as both an increasing vol1 37
ume of such cases and their increasing monetary value.
Professor Owen describes the definition of the forbidden conduct
as an area of punitive damage reform "where refinement is most
needed.' 1 38 Owen suggests abandonment of the "wanton," "willful"
and kindred language previously employed in cases such as Chambers v. Montgomery. Instead, Owen advocates a test of liability
based upon the defendant's "flagrant indifference to the public
safety.' 39 Owen believes that, since manufacturers often have to
make market decisions concerning products which they know will
harm some consumers (such as automobiles), a lay person's failure
to appreciate the dynamics involved in making those decisions will
result in a tendency of jurors to too easily describe the manufacturer's conduct as "reckless.' 14 0 According to Owen, the "flagrant
indifference" standard would require objective proof of the manufacturer's attitude concerning consumer safety and will punish
only "extreme departures from the norm.''
Some states, in adhering to the traditional definitions of conduct
punishable by punitive damages, rather than abandoning those
definitions, have modified the traditional civil liability "preponderance of the evidence" burden of proof. Oregon, for example, has by
statute imposed a "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof
on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages in products liability. "' 2 Oregon has retained "wanton disregard" as its definition of the pro43
scribed conduct.
136.
137.
138.
139.
standard
140.
141.
142.
688 P.2d

143.

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 6-12.
Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 20-21.
Id. See also id. at n. 94 for citations to cases in which the "flagrant indifference"
was adopted.
Id. at 21-28.
Id. at 24.
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (1983). See also In re Conduct of Morrow, 297 Or. 808,
820 (1984).
OR. REV. STAT.

§ 30.925 (1983).
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Should Pennsylvania follow such a course and raise the burden
of proof, there would be no radical departure from past practice in
other civil actions. For example, Pennsylvania requires that clear
and convincing evidence be presented by parties seeking to rebut
the presumption of testamentary capacity in probate proceedings.1 4 ' Since a heightened burden of proof must be met to rebut
testamentary capacity, there is no legitimate reason, other than a
rigid adherence to time-worn legal standards not to require a
heightened burden of proof to rebut the presumption that a civil
14 5
defendant did not engage in "outrageous" conduct.
Colorado has moved the step beyond a "clear and convincing"
burden of proof and requires that a plaintiff seeking punitive damages establish "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct."' Unlike Oregon's statute, which
is limited to punitive damages in products liability cases, the Colorado statute applies to all punitive damage claims. The Colorado
statute reflects the burden of proof advocated by the National
Product Liability Council (NPLC) in its Proposed Uniform State
Product Liability Act.147 In addition to the heightened burden of
proof, the NPLC advocates a monetary limit of treble the compen1 48
satory damage award.
Regardless of whether the description of prohibited conduct is
made more strict, or a higher burden of proof is imposed, reform of
the legal standards currently employed is needed. No empirical evidence can possibly establish unequivocably that the higher burden
of proof has resulted in a denial of punitive damages where a "preponderance of the evidence" standard would have resulted in a punitive damage award. Logic dictates, however, that a heightened
burden of proof would accomplish a needed reform of the manner
in which punitive damages are assessed, simply by informing the
jury that the plaintiff, in order to receive punitive damages, must
144. See In re Brantlinger's Estate, 418 Pa. 236, 210 A.2d 246 (1965).
145. Professor Wheeler advocates the adoption of the "clear and convincing" test. See
Wheeler, supra note 1, at 311-14.
Even certain commentators sympathetic to the recovery of punitive damages in products
liability actions advocate adoption of a "clear and convincing" standard in Pennsylvania
products liability punitive damages actions. See Comment, supra note 13, at 223-30.
146. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1973). Colorado courts will permit punitive damages where the plaintiff establishes that the defendant engaged in "fraud, malice or insult,
or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured parties rights and feelings." Id. § 13-21102 (1973).
147. See PROPOSED UNIFORM STATE PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 206.
148. Id.
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present evidence to satisfy a sterner test than that presented to
establish the defendant's liability.
C.

Bifurcation of the Liability and Damages Aspects of Trial

Pennsylvania currently permits bifurcation of the liability and
damages portions of trials in order to avoid undue prejudice to defendants in civil actions.14 9 Bifurcation of theories of liability may
be employed where multiple defendants are involved, such as in
Walasavage v. Marinelli,15 0 where the plaintiff pursued an action
against one defendant on a negligence theory and against another
1 51
defendant on a strict liability theory.
Bifurcation is also permitted in Pennsylvania divorce proceedings, where a judge can enter a divorce decree prior to the resolution of all issues, such as property rights.1 52 In Pennsylvania criminal law dealing with capital punishment, the guilt phase and
1 53
sentencing phase are bifurcated.
Bifurcation is an often employed procedural device and is often
proposed as a means of avoiding excessive punitive damage verdicts in products liability. 154 Separating the process of liability determination from the assessment of damages may have the effect
not only of avoiding excessive verdicts, but also reducing appeals
and remittiturs of punitive damage awards if the judge, rather
than the jury, assesses the punitive damage award. Much has been
written concerning the ability of jurors to comprehend, not only
complex scientific evidence, but the various legal standards to apply to the evidence presented.155 Presumably, the judge would be
better equipped to deal with applying the law to the evidence and
is less likely to be overwhelmed by an attorney's fiery exhortations
to punish a defendant.
Professor Owen advocates assigning the duty to evaluate the appropriateness of punitive damages to the judge after the jury decides the compensatory damage award;15 1 Connecticut, by statute,
149. See, e.g., Kubit v. Russ, 287 Pa. Super. 29, 429 A.2d 703 (1981).
150. Pa. Super. -,
483 A.2d 509 (1983).
151. Id.
152. See Wolk v. Wolk, Pa. Super. -,
464 A.2d 1359 (1983).
153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stoyko, Pa. -,
475 A.2d 714, 720 n.2 (1984)
(construing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502(a) (Purdon 1982)).
154. See Wheeler, supra note 1, at 300-02; Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive
Damages, supra note 1, at 89-91; Comment, supra note 111.
155. See Seltzer, supra note 1, at 49.
156. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages, supra note 1, at 52.
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has adopted such an approach.15 7 This approach may also alleviate
prejudice against a defendant that a jury may feel when it is advised that other juries, in other actions, have found that punitive
damages were appropriate; the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
section 908 comment e, calls for the introduction into evidence of
prior punitive damage awards assessed against the defendant.' 58
Conceivably, such evidence would cause a jury to reconsider imposing punitive damages in light of the fact that the defendant has
already been punished. However, if the court considers each injury
to each plaintiff to be a separate tort, as was apparently done in
Neal v. Carey CanadianMines,1 59 the introduction of evidence of
prior punitive damage awards may convince some jurors that punitive damages are appropriate in the case sub judice.
Prejudice against the defendant may also result from evidence of
the defendant's wealth, which is considered to be a necessary prerequisite to assessing punitive damages in order to enable the jury
or the court to assess an amount sufficient to punish the defendant.16 0 Requiring the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case for
punitive damages, prior to trial, may solve this problem of
prejudice. Once the prima facie case is established, the trial can
proceed on the merits of liability and damages. Briefly stated, since
bifurcation is a readily accepted procedural device in Pennsylvania, there is abundant precedent for its use in products liability
where punitive damages are sought.
D.

Consolidation

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 213 permits consolidation
of "actions involving a common question of law and fact."1 61 The
trial judge may consolidate or separate such actions at his discre157. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1983).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment e provides, inter alia, "It seems
appropriate to take into consideration both the punitive damages that have been awarded in
prior suits and those that may be granted in the future, with greater weight being given to
the prior awards." Id.
159. 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
160. See Woodbury, Limiting Discovery of a Defendant's Wealth When Punitive
Damages are Alleged, 23 DuQ. L. REV. 349 (1984).
161. PA. R. Civ. P. 213, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. Rule 213 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, the court on its own motion or on motion of any party may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all of the matters in issue in the actions, may order all of the
actions consolidated, and may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as
may avoid unnecessary costs or delay.

1985

Punitive Damages

tion either sua sponte or upon either party's motion; consolidation
is not a matter of right.1 62 Judicial economy is the primary goal to
be obtained by consolidation. Since mass-market torts would necessarily involve similar injuries from the use of similar products,
the amenability of these cases to consolidation is obvious. Consolidation may encourage the settlement of various claims by expediting the negotiation process. A. H. Robins, Inc., for example, recently settled 198 "Dalkon Shield" lawsuits in Minnesota following
a consolidation.16 3
Since the conduct of the manufacturer of a product resulting in
injuries to many plaintiffs is a single act, consideration should also
be given to certifying the plaintiffs as a class. Such consideration
should be given even if each injury is considered a separate act of
the manufacturer, since the separate acts are nonetheless identical
as to each plaintiff. Certification, following individual determinations of compensatory damages, would prevent the virtual lottery
which exists where one plaintiff receives a large punitive damage
verdict, whereas a similarly injured plaintiff receives a small verdict or no verdict, even though the manufacturer's conduct is the
same as to each plaintiff. 6
To gain class certification Pennsylvania courts require, generally,
numerosity, commonality of interests, ability of the class representative to adequately represent the class members, and efficiency of
adjudication.1 65 While there is no test for the minimum number of
162. See Pulliam v. Laurel School Dist., Pa. Super. -, 462 A.2d 1380, 1383
(1983); Feld v. Merriam, 314 Pa. Super. 414, 461 A.2d 225, 237 (1983).
163. Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1984, at 3, col. 2. Professor Wheeler believes that consolidation may hinder settlement where issues relating to compensatory damages vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. Wheeler did not confine his consideration of punitive damages, however, to
cases in which plaintiffs had received similar injuries and medical treatment as a result of
use of the same product. Wheeler, supra note 1, at 83-92.
164. Chief Justice Erickson of the Colorado Supreme Court proposed consolidation of
similar punitive damage claims. "Such consolidation of claims would make it possible for a
jury to make one punitive damage award which could then be held in trust for appropriate
distribution among all successful plaintiffs." 684 P.2d at 227 (Erickson, C.J., dissenting).
165. PA R. Civ. P. 1702, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all members in a class action only
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class;
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately assert and protect the interests of the class under the criteria set forth in Rule 1709; and
(5) a class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of the controversy under the criteria set forth in Rule 1708.
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plaintiffs required to obtain class certification,""6 it is clear that
claims involving, for example, toxic torts will be sufficiently numer-7
1
ous to "pose a grave imposition on the court" if tried separately. 1
Therefore, where the product of a mass-marketer results in numerous injuries, consideration should be given to consolidation of the
individual actions or certification of the injured plaintiffs as a
class, as done in the "Dalkon Shield" case in the Northern District
1 68
of California.
E.

Statutory Limitations of the Amount of Punitive Damages

Several states impose statutory ceilings on the amount of punitive damages which may be awarded in cases involving specified
conduct. 6 9 Pennsylvania imposes no limitation on the amount of
punitive damages, but does impose limitations on actual damages
awardable in actions involving certain designated parties. For example, actions against a local governmental unit are subject to a
1 70
$500,000 maximum.
Limitations on the amount a jury may award would significantly
control the currently unfettered discretion of a jury in assessing
punitive damages. The current standard of appellate review of an
allegedly excessive award-whether the award is so large as to indicate that it was influenced by passion or prejudice' 7 1 -is so subjective as to seemingly encourage an excessive number of appeals.
A ceiling based upon a specified multiple of the compensatory
damages, as in the Connecticut statute, 172 which imposes a ceiling
of treble actual damages, would reduce appeals from punitive damId.
166. Temple Univ. v. Pa. Dept. of Public Welfare, 30 Pa. Commw. 595, 603, 374 A.2d
991, 996 (1977).
167. Id. In many mass-market products liability cases, satisfying the numerosity requirement will pose little difficulty. For example, Johns-Manville is facing approximately
54,000 asbestosis claims and A. H. Robins currently is contending with approximately
11,000 Dalkon Shield injury claims. See Comment, supra note 77. See also supra note 68.
168. In re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Litigation, 526 F.
Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
169. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-204b (1984) (punitive damages in product
liability shall not exceed an amount double compensatory damages); CAL. Civ. P. CODE §
1174(b) (West Supp. 1984) (punitive damages for malicious wrongful detainer shall not exceed an amount triple rent and actual damages). See also THE PROPOSED UNIFORM STATE
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 206 (punitive damages shall not exceed an amount triple compensatory damages).

§ 8553(b)

170.

PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.

171.
172.

Delahanty, 464 A.2d at 1265.
See supra note 169.

(Purdon 1982).
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age awards while accomplishing the punishment and deterrence
goals sought to be obtained in Pennsylvania courts.
Pennsylvania courts have consistently held that there should be
73
no specified ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.
1 74
The superior court in Delahanty v. First Pennsylvania Bank
maintained that a fixed ratio "would run counter to the object of
punitive damages, which is to punish the defendant and set an example to deter him and others from this type of conduct in the
future."1 5 The Delahanty court, however, did not explain why it
believed that a fixed ratio, or a limitation on damages, does not
constitute punishment. Requiring a defendant to pay an amount in
excess of the actual harm inflicted is clearly punishment, especially
in Pennsylvania, where that additional expense cannot be defrayed
by insurance. The Delahanty court also noted that Pennsylvania
courts have traditionally required a "reasonable relationship" between the compensatory and punitive damages.1 7 1 Since there is no
"fixed ratio" or a ceiling on the amount of punitive damages, the
reasonableness of the relationship of compensatory to punitive
damages, must vary from case to case, depending "on the egregiousness of the actors conduct and the relative generosity of the
M
compensatory award.

77

The flexibility given a jury may be appropriate in one-on-one
torts, but may lead to inconsistent results in products liability
cases. A manufacturer, for example, which markets power drills
under conditions which the jury finds calls for punitive damages,
and which causes electrical shock to users of the drill cannot reasonably be considered to have engaged in conduct more egregious
as to the first user than the second. Under the current state of
Pennsylvania law, however, the first user of the drill may receive a
punitive damage award substantially greater than that received by
the second. No rational reason exists to benefit one plaintiff over
another where the defendant's conduct, and the plaintiff's injuries,
are the same. The potentially disparate treatment of similarly injured plaintiffs calls for a flat rate amount of punitive damages or a
muliplier applied to compensatory damages beyond which no punitive damages may be awarded. A statutorily defined limitation on
punitive damages will allow the defendant to be punished by the
173. See Daley v. John Wanamaker, Inc.,
174. 464 A.2d 1243 (1983).
175. Id. at 1265.
176. Id.
177. Id.

-

Pa. Super.

-,

464 A.2d 355, 358 (1983).
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payment of an amount in excess of the compensatory award while
at the same time reducing appeals contesting the reasonableness of
the relationship of the punitive damages to the compensatory
damages.
F. Limiting Punitive Damages to Defendant's Conduct in
Relation to the Plaintiff
Following remand by the Third Circuit in Hoffman v. Sterling
Drug Co. 178 the district court held that any punitive damage assessment must be in a reasonable amount in relation to the defendant's conduct vis-a-vis the plaintiff.1 7 9 Relying upon Pennsylvania
authority that punitive damages must be reasonably related to the
compensatory damages, the court denied the plaintiff permission
to argue to the jury that it should consider the wrong committed
by the defendant against all of society.16 0 The plaintiff had desired
to argue that since punitive damages are imposed to punish conduct that society finds reprehensible, the amount awarded to the
plaintiff should reflect the wrong perpetrated against all consumers
of the product.' 8 The court rejected such an argument since it
would permit the plaintiff to recover on the basis of the defen82
dant's actions against parties not involved in the lawsuit.1
Should Pennsylvania not adopt a ceiling or a fixed ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in products liability cases,
the requirement of a reasonable relationship of compensatory damages to punitive damages, defined by specific criteria, will auger
against a plaintiff collecting punitive damages on behalf of society.
Therefore, as long as there is no statutorily defined limitation, the
requirement of a reasonable relationship of the various types of
damages should be retained in order to avoid such unwarranted
results as that in Palmerv. A. H. Robins.'83 The Colorado Supreme
178. 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973).
179. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug Co., 374 F. Supp. 850 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
180. Id. at 856.
181. Id.
182. The court stated:
Applying the plaintiff's rationale, each injured consumer of Aralen, using identical
evidence regarding testing, notice, etc., could individually recover on behalf of "society" to punish the affront. Such a result would be ludicrous. Instead, we view the law
to be that each Aralen consumer showing a bona fide injury may, if the evidence
warrants, collect his reasonable proportion of the punitive damages the defendant
owes to "society".
Id. at 857.
183. 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).
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Court in Palmer, in affirming a $600,000 compensatory damage
and a $6,200,000 punitive damage award, discussed the defendant's
marketing program "directed to a vast array of unwary consumers." 8 ' This language, plus the size of the award, indicates that the
Palmer court apparently permitted the plaintiff to collect punitive
damages on behalf of the "vast array" of Dalkon Shield plaintiffs,
although one must doubt that the court would expect the plaintiff
to actually share the award with the "vast array of unwary
consumers."
G. Limiting or Barring Punitive Damages Against Successor
Corporations
Occasionally, courts will be confronted with situations in which
the corporate entity which manufactured and marketed the injuryproducing product no longer exists due to merger, acquisition or
dissolution of the corporate entity; the defendant in a products liability suit may thus be a successor to the interests of such a manufacturer. As a general rule, successor corporations are liable for the
torts of their predecessor.'8 5 Should this liability include liability
for punitive damages based upon the predecessor's actions?
If the successor corporation's management is dominated by individuals not responsible for the prior marketing of the product, the
goals of punishment and deterrence cannot be obtained. The
Pennsylvania Superior Court in Martin v. Johns-Manville recognized that successor liability should have a limited application
where punitive damages are sought on the basis of a predecessor's
conduct. The Martin court set forth guidelines of the propriety of
punitive damages against successor corporations, which, it is
hoped, will be adopted by other courts addressing the issue. Where
punitive damages are sought against a successor corporation, according to Martin, courts should look to whether the change in
corporate identity was "accompanied by major changes in the
identity of the predecessor's shareholders, officers, directors, and
management personnel."'8 6 Where there are no such major
184. 684 P.2d at 220.
185. See generally 15 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 7123 (Perm. ed.
1983).
186. 469 A.2d at 667. The Martin court realized that there would be situations where
the successor corporation management will be comprised of individuals who were involved
in the management of the predecessor as well as a significant number of relative newcomers.
The propriety of awarding punitive damages in such a situation will require "case by case"
evaluation. Id. at 667 n.22.
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changes, punitive damages may be appropriate since the proper
tortfeasors will be punished.
The preceding discussion assumes, of course, that assessing punitive damages against a corporate entity actually punishes and deters those officers and directors responsible for the tortious conduct. Whether those individuals ever personally bear the effects of
the punishment is a question aimed more at the efficacy of punitive damages against corporations in general rather than against
successor corporations in particular.
The approach of the Martin court is, however, decidedly preferable to that of the court in Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines.1 87 In
permitting punitive damages against the successor corporation, the
district court merely noted that successors are liable for the torts
of their predecessor. 8' 8 The district court failed to engage in the
thoughtful analysis, as did the Martin court, of whether punitive
damages against successor corporations are effective to accomplish
their intended purpose.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether the reprehensible conduct sought to be deterred by punitive damages is classified as "outrageous" or a "flagrant disregard
of the public safety," punitive damages should not be precluded in
all products liability actions since mass-marketers are as capable of
engaging in reprehensible conduct as individual tortfeasors.
The questions concerning punitive damages in products liability
thus should not concern whether these damages are properly recoverable in products cases, but rather concern the x standards by
which punitive damages should be recovered and the extent of that
recovery. Punitive damages against corporate defendants raise
questions of fairness, uniformity of adjudication, and impartiality
of the adjudication not found in other civil tort actions. Products
liability punitive damages, as currently permitted in Pennsylvania,
affect individuals only tangentially involved in the tortious conduct, and too tangentially to deserve punishment. The ends of punitive damages cannot be justified by the means if large numbers
of innocent third parties end up bearing the brunt of the
punishment.
Since punitive damages should be retained in order to express
society's condemnation of certain conduct, procedures must be de187.
188.

548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
Id. at 391.
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veloped to safeguard the defendant's right to judicial fairness, and
freedom from capricious punishment to which a "faceless" corporate entity is too easily subject. In view of the relatively embryonic
state of development of Pennsylvania's case law concerning punitive damages in products liability actions, Pennsylvania courts
have the opportunity to enact procedures which will preserve the
court's ability to mete out punishment where appropriate while
also preventing excessive levels of unnecessary punishment.
Jeffrey G. Brooks

